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The International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR)1 
govern how 196 countries and WHO collectively address 
the global spread of disease and avoid unnecessary 
interference with international traffic and trade. Article 43 
of this legally binding instrument restricts the measures 
countries can implement when addressing public health 
risks to those measures that are supported by science, 
commensurate with the risks involved, and anchored in 
human rights.1 The intention of the IHR is that countries 
should not take needless measures that harm people or 
that disincentivise countries from reporting new risks to 
international public health authorities.2
In imposing travel restrictions against China during 
the current outbreak of 2019 novel coronavirus disease 
(COVID-19), many countries are violating the IHR. We—
16 global health law scholars—came to this conclusion 
after applying the interpretive framework of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties3 and reaching a 
jurisprudential consensus on the legal meaning of IHR 
Article 43 (panel).
We explain our conclusion here. First, under Article 43.2, 
countries cannot implement additional health measures 
exclusively as a precaution but must rather ground their 
decision making in “scientific principles”, “scientific 
evidence”, and “advice from WHO”.1 Many of the travel 
restrictions being implemented during the COVID-19 
outbreak are not supported by science or WHO. Travel 
restrictions for these kinds of viruses have been challenged 
by public health researchers,4–6 and WHO has advised 
against travel restrictions, arguing they cause more harm 
than good.7,8
Second, under Article 43.1 any additional health 
measures implemented by countries “shall not be 
more restrictive of international traffic and not more 
invasive or intrusive to persons than reasonably available 
alternatives”.1 In this case, even if travel restrictions did 
work, there are so many other more effective measures 
that countries can take to protect their citizens. WHO 
has issued COVID-19 technical guidance on several such 
measures, including risk communication, surveillance, 
patient management, and screening at ports of entry 
and exit.9
Third, and most importantly, Article 3.1 strictly requires 
all additional health measures to be implemented 
“with full respect for the dignity, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of persons”,1 which in turn must 
reflect the international law principles of necessity, 
legitimacy, and proportionality that govern limitations 
to and derogations from rights and freedoms.10 Under 
no circumstances should public health or foreign policy 
decisions be based on the racism and xenophobia that 
are now being directed at Chinese people and those of 
Asian descent.11
Many of the travel restrictions implemented by 
dozens of countries during the COVID-19 outbreak are 
therefore violations of the IHR.12 Yet, perhaps even more 
troubling, is that at least two-thirds of these countries 
have not reported their additional health measures to 
WHO,12 which is a further violation of IHR Articles 43.3 
and 43.5. Flagrant disregard for the legal requirement 
to promptly report any additional health measures 
frustrates WHO’s ability to coordinate the world’s 
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response to public health emergencies and prevents 
countries from holding each other accountable for their 
obligations under the IHR.
Some countries argue that they would rather be safe 
than sorry. But evidence belies the claim that illegal 
travel restrictions make countries safer.4–6 In the short 
term, travel restrictions prevent supplies from getting 
into affected areas, slow down the international public 
health response, stigmatise entire populations, and 
disproportionately harm the most vulnerable among us. 
In the longer term, countries selecting which international 
laws to follow encourages other countries to do the same, 
which in turn undermines the broader rules-based world 
order. Effective global governance is not possible when 
countries cannot depend on each other to comply with 
international agreements.13
Of course, the IHR is far from perfect. For example, 
the IHR only governs countries, not corporations and 
other non-governmental actors. Thus, some countries 
are finding themselves with de-facto travel restrictions 
when airlines stop flying to places affected by COVID-19. 
Additionally, the IHR does not have robust accountability 
mechanisms for compliance, enforcement, oversight, 
and transparency.14
But the IHR is the legally binding system for protecting 
people worldwide from the global spread of disease. With 
more than 2·5 billion people travelling between about 
4000 airports every year,15 future outbreaks are inevitable. 
Responses that are anchored in fear, misinformation, 
racism, and xenophobia will not save us from outbreaks 
like COVID-19. Upholding the rule of international law 
is needed now more than ever. Countries can start by 
rolling back illegal travel restrictions that have already 
been implemented and by supporting WHO and each 
other in implementing the IHR.
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Panel: International Health Regulations (2005) Article 43.1 to 43.5 on Additional Health Measures
1 These Regulations shall not preclude States Parties from 
implementing health measures, in accordance with their 
relevant national law and obligations under international 
law, in response to specific public health risks or public 
health emergencies of international concern, which:
(a) achieve the same or greater level of health protection 
than WHO recommendations; or
(b) are otherwise prohibited under Article 25, Article 26, 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 28, Article 30, paragraph 1(c)
of Article 31 and Article 33, provided such measures are 
otherwise consistent with these Regulations.
Such measures shall not be more restrictive of international 
traffic and not more invasive or intrusive to persons than 
reasonably available alternatives that would achieve the 
appropriate level of health protection.
2 In determining whether to implement the health measures 
referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article or additional health 
measures under paragraph 2 of Article 23, paragraph 1 of 
Article 27, paragraph 2 of Article 28 and paragraph 2(c) of 
Article 31, States Parties shall base their determinations upon:
(a) scientific principles;
(b) available scientific evidence of a risk to human 
health, or where such evidence is insufficient, the 
available information including from WHO and other 
relevant intergovernmental organizations and 
international bodies; and
(c) any available specific guidance or advice from WHO.
3 A State Party implementing additional health measures 
referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article which significantly 
interfere with international traffic shall provide to WHO the 
public health rationale and relevant scientific information 
for it. WHO shall share this information with other States 
Parties and shall share information regarding the health 
measures implemented. For the purpose of this Article, 
significant interference generally means refusal of entry or 
departure of international travellers, baggage, cargo, 
containers, conveyances, goods, and the like, or their delay, 
for more than 24 hours.
4 After assessing information provided pursuant to paragraph 
3 and 5 of this Article and other relevant information, 
WHO may request that the State Party concerned reconsider 
the application of the measures.
5 A State Party implementing additional health measures 
referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article that 
significantly interfere with international traffic shall inform 
WHO, within 48 hours of implementation, of such measures 
and their health rationale unless these are covered by a 
temporary or standing recommendation.
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